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Humans and monkeys occasionally report the presence of a stimulus that has not occurred. A new study by
Carnevale et al. (2015) sheds light on the nature and timing of the neural mechanisms that give rise to false
detections.Most of the time, our subjective experi-
ence of the world accurately reflects the
information arriving at our sense recep-
tors. When I see a face in front of me, it is
because another person is there; when
my arm is itchy, it is because a mosquito
has bitten me there. However, many of
us will have experienced fleeting misper-
ceptions: a subjective experience that
does not have an obvious sensory precur-
sor. These illusory perceptions often
follow the receipt of information that pre-
dicts the forthcoming experience (Sum-
merfield and de Lange, 2014). Hearing a
ghost story late at night might change
our interpretation of unexpected sights
or sounds, or being told to watch out for
bedbugs might make us spontaneously
start scratching an imaginary insect bite.
These experiences might be heightened
whenone is tired, or after the consumption
of psychoactive substances, or in some
psychiatric disease states, but they can
also occur even in the healthy, sober, res-
ted state. Why do these misperceptions
arise, and what features of our neural cir-
cuitry make them possible? In this issue
of Neuron, Carnevale et al. (2015) offer
important new insights into the neural
mechanisms that give rise to ‘‘illusory’’
reported perceptions.
The mechanisms that underlie percep-
tual decisions can be studied in the labo-
ratory using psychophysical methods,
where the intensity of sensory stimulation
can be carefully controlled and the re-
ported perception can be accurately
measured. In one influential paradigm,
macaque monkeys report the presence
or absence of a mechanical vibration
applied to the skin of one fingertip, while
neuronal recordings are made from
somatosensory, parietal, and premotor
cortical regions. Vibration first excites
neurons in early somatosensory cortices,where firing rates correlate with the inten-
sity of stimulation, but subsequent activity
in secondary somatosensory, parietal,
and premotor cortices correlates with
the decision made by the monkey. In
these regions, many neurons respond to
the vibration only when the monkey
correctly reports it had occurred (‘‘hits’’)
but not when the monkey fails to report
it (‘‘misses’’) (de Lafuente and Romo,
2005). This transition from sensation to
a perceptual decision signal seems to
occur gradually, both across time and
along different stages of the cortical hier-
archy (de Lafuente and Romo, 2006).
However, like every psychophysical
detection paradigm, this approach yields
another class of error trial: those on which
the monkey reported a perception, even
in the absence of stimulation (‘‘false
alarms’’). Studying false alarms can help
us to arbitrate among competing theories
of how choices are formed. In the visual
domain, reported misperceptions are
associated with levels of sensory activity
that resemble those evoked by veridical
sensory input. For example, blurry images
that areperceivedas faceselicit compara-
ble levels of fMRI activity in face-sensitive
regionsof the fusiformgyrus (Summerfield
et al., 2006). This implies that false alarms
are not just guesses, but occurwhen deci-
sion regions read out sensory activity of a
comparable amplitude to that occurring
during veridical perception.
In the study reported here, monkeys re-
ported the presence or absence of vibro-
tactile stimuli that could occur at any point
in a decision period lasting from 1.5 to
3.5 s after a key down (KD) event initiating
each trial. In a previous analysis of this
data set, Carnevale and colleagues
showed that false alarms trials are associ-
ated with two unique neural signatures in
macaque premotor cortex, each with aNeurondistinct temporal profile. First, firing rates
on false alarm trials begin to grow at
1.5 s after KD and are sustained at higher
levels than on other trial types throughout
the decision period and into a subsequent
delay. Second, cross-correlations be-
tween spike counts in simultaneously re-
corded neurons wax and wane across
the decision period, peaking roughly in
the middle (2.5 s after KD). In this earlier
paper, the authors use a computational
model to show that detection judgments
can be understood as depending on
both amplitude of the applied stimulus
and on a slowly fluctuating signal that pro-
vides correlated input to the neuronal
population (Carnevale et al., 2012).
Here, the authors go a step further,
introducing an innovative new analysis
technique that capitalizes on the hetero-
geneity of single neuron responses in the
premotor cortex. The responses of single
neurons within decision-related brain
regions are often very variable, and re-
searchers are often obliged to carefully
sub-select neurons of a given class or
to attempt to cluster neurons by their
response profiles. Instead, Carnevale
and colleagues leverage this variability,
averaging single neuron responses on hit
trials to form a ‘‘template’’ that they then
used to detect signal-like events on false
alarm trials. Using the correct rejection
trials (on which no stimulus was applied
and none was reported) as a control,
the authors show that ‘‘FA events,’’
(i.e., cell-specific neural signatures that
matched this template) occurred most
frequently when the monkey made false
alarm. Moreover, these FA events tended
to cluster within decision period, when the
monkey was presumably expecting the
stimulus to occur.
Next, using amultivariate analysis tech-
nique (Stokes et al., 2013) to estimate how86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 861
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Figure 1. Simulation of the Estimated Stimulation Distributions and
Estimated Hazard Functions
(A and B) Simulation of the estimated stimulation distributions (top row) and
estimated hazard functions (bottom row) for an ideal observer (A) and a real-
istic observer with temporal estimation that becomes noisier with time (B). For
an ideal observer, the hazard function increases as time elapses. For the real-
istic observer, the noise in the estimation process smooths the hazard func-
tion, and the Weber compression shifts the peak earlier in time, similar to
the temporal profile of FA events reported by Carnevale et al. (2015).
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constructed population activ-
ity encoded the intensity of
stimulation, and the evolution
of detection, they found that
hits and false alarms shared
similar trajectories, whereas
misses and correct rejections
showed limited encoding
of these variables. In other
words, false alarms occurred
not only because of elevated
baseline activity, as previ-
ously reported, but because
specific neural signatures
(‘‘ghosts’’ in the decision
process) resembling those
evoked by veridical sensory
stimulation were present in
the premotor signal.
Together, these findings
reveal that during the detec-
tion task, the monkeys are
not passive recipients of
somatosensory information.
Rather, they capitalize on tem-
poral expectations—learned
information about the likely
timing of sensory inputs—to
maximize theprobability of de-
tecting the stimulus at each
point in time (Nobre et al.,
2007). One likely interpretation
of the slowly fluctuating input
signal that drives the premotor
neurons in common is thus
that it reflects temporal ex-
pectations about when the
stimulus will arrive. Previousstudies in the visual domain have sug-
gested that widespread, slowly fluctuating
signals evolve to match the timing of stim-
ulation, perhaps acting as a time-varying
gain control signal in perceptual decision
making (Lakatos et al., 2008; Wyart et al.,
2012). Indeed, the observation that the
network evolves through characteristic
states is consistent with the authors’ view
that neural responses are partly driven by
a slow, time-vary latent state that can
encode information about the likely timing
of events (Goel and Buonomano, 2014).
Nevertheless, there are some features
of the data described by Carnevale and
colleagues that are curious and merit
further investigation. When onset times
are variable, the function that tracks the
probability of stimulation over time is862 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevierknown as the hazard function. Where the
stimulus probability is uniform (as was
the case here), the hazard function grows
steadily across the decision period.
Consider, for example, an ideal observer
detecting a noiseless stimulus that could
occur at any point across a 2-s interval,
which for convenience we divide into ten
time bins of 200 ms each (Figure 1A, up-
per panel). Assuming that the stimulus is
present on half of all trials, the probability
of the stimulus occurring in the first time
bin is exactly 1 in 20, or 5%. However,
given that no stimulus has been detected
in the first nine time bins, the probability
that it will occur in the final bin is 1 in 11,
or about 9.1%. The hazard function thus
grows over time, in a fashion similar to
that shown in Figure 1A (lower panel). InInc.a visual detection task, the
buildup activity of neurons in
the lateral intraparietal area
(LIP) has been shown to track
a ‘‘smooth’’ version of the
hazard function, as if the
monkeys were basing their
choices on a noisy time-vary-
ing estimate of stimulus prob-
ability (Janssen and Shadlen,
2005). Indeed, in the authors’
previous analyses of these
data, the overall firing rate on
FA trials increases steadily
after KD and is sustained
into the subsequent delay
period, apparently tracking
the optimal hazard function
(Carnevale et al., 2012).
In the new study, the proba-
bility of FA events is maximal
within the expected decision
period, showing that the mon-
keys exhibit temporal expec-
tations. However, its peak oc-
curs early, and falls off as the
decision period progresses—
the opposite of what might be
expected given the hazard
function for stimulation. One
possibility is that unlike in pre-
vious studies where stimula-
tion was guaranteed to occur
on every trial, here the hazard
function rises only modestly
across the decision epoch.
Noise in either sensory pro-
cessing or temporal estima-
tion would flatten and smooththe distribution of perceived onsets yet
further (Figure 1B, upper panel), as the
monkeys use prior information about the
central tendencyof stimulusonset toguide
their temporal expectations (Jazayeri and
Shadlen, 2010). Finally, uncertainty in the
estimation of time interval increases
proportionally to its duration (i.e., Weber’s
law) (Gibbon et al., 1997; Janssen and
Shadlen, 2005). This induces a compres-
sion of timeperception that shifts temporal
expectations forward, toward the start of
the decision period (Figure 1B, lower
panel). Indeed, that the monkeys seem to
expect stimuli early in the decision period
is also suggested by behavioral data; the
hit rate steadily declines as a function
of stimulus onset, both for high- and low-
amplitude stimulation trials.
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PreviewsTheauthorsargue that their results show
a dynamic modulation of response crite-
rion, expressed as a boundary in state
space (or ‘‘separatrix’’) that segregates
the ‘‘yes’’ from the ‘‘no’’ choices. Using a
dynamic, recurrent neural network simula-
tion, they were able to recreate key fea-
tures of their data, including the early
peak of FA events and the state space tra-
jectories of the network on each trial type.
One interesting next step for Carnevale
and colleagues could be to try to relate
the three neural phenomena they have
now described that accompany somato-
sensory false alarms in premotor cortex:
sustained increases in overall firing rate, a
late peak in spikecorrelations, andanearly
peak in FA events. They will also need to
relate their findings to elegant psycho-
physical work that suggested that tempo-
ral expectations might do more than
modulate the proximity of the network
state to a choice boundary—they might
actively increase signal-to-noise ratios,resulting in more sensitive detection of
sensory events (Rohenkohl et al., 2012).
Precisely how temporal expectations
modulate perceptual decisions remains
an open question, but Carnavale and col-
leagues offer new insights and new tools
for unravelling this interesting question
and for deciphering the neural signatures
of false detection in the primate brain.REFERENCES
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